# POLITICAL TRUST IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE ARAB REGION

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we examine political trust in two similar but distinct regions of the developing world: Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region. We detail the trends in political trust in these regions cross-nationally and over-time, focusing on unique regional challenges. The constituent roles of the state, institutions, and threat environment create regional contexts influencing levels of individual trust in formal political institutions. We use multilevel modeling to demonstrate how country-level (macro-level) factors shape overall trust levels within countries and account for much of the observed cross-national variation within regions. These insights reveal much about the important factors influencing trust in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region and may apply more broadly to the developing world.

Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region share a host of challenges that, in turn, strongly influence observed patterns of trust in government. Both regions have distinctive features that shape political trust in divergent ways. It is precisely this mixture of similarity and contrast that make these regions interesting cases to study and important to improving our understanding of political trust and state-society relations. We use these regions to address several intriguing puzzles about political trust in this chapter.

Both regions are strong candidates to evaluate the impact of different state-level factors on individual political trust. Political trust is largely learned (Ridley 1997; Newton 2007). Demographic characteristics are demonstrated to have minimal influence while some individual attitudinal dispositions exert stronger effects on political trust (Abramson 1983; Newton 2001, 2007; Hetherington 2005). Bratton et al (2005) and others consistently show that, at the individual-level, the antecedents associated with greater trust in government is virtually identical among Sub-Saharan Africans as compared to advanced industrial countries (also see Hutchison 2011b; Hutchison and Johnson 2011). Respondents from the Arab region also demonstrate similarity to other regions in individual-level antecedents of political trust. Yet, the patterns of political trust levels in these regions are substantially different than those found in other regions. Previous research focused on political trust in Africa contends that differences are due to state-level factors rather than simply artifacts of composition effects. We build on earlier research demonstrating how contextual factors exert a strong influence on individual political trust in Sub-Saharan Africa and extend this analysis to the Arab region.

Unlike more economically advanced countries where citizen expectations of government performance tend to focus on issues like procedural fairness, we are able to assess individual political trust in regions where expectations center on more rudimentary functions of the state, namely institutional capacity and external security. Examining these two regions in conjunction provide us an opportunity to estimate what effect the legacy of state development and institutional capacity influences political trust. Given the paucity of interstate conflict in advanced industrial countries over the last two decades, we are able to evaluate the effect that salient external threats have on domestic political trust in regions experiencing a host of events.

These puzzles drive our approach in understanding political trust patterns and their antecedents in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region. Two primary state-level factors influence political trust: state institutional capacity and salient external threat. Although state institutional capacity strongly influences political trust, the direction of this effect is contingent on whether the nature of the institutional structure is extractive or distributive. Higher institutional capacity in states with extractive institutional structures (where institutions are designed to extract taxes and redistribute resources) are associated with increased political trust as those governments are inherently more reliant and responsive

to domestic populations. In distributive structures (where institutions simply allocate or distribute resources derived from resource rents or aid paid directly to the state), higher capacity is associated with lower political trust because resources are not reliant on domestic populations allowing governments to function almost independently. Not coincidentally, patterns of state development have left Sub-Saharan Africa predominately comprised of extractive states while the Arab region is dominated by distributive states. Second, we propose that salient external threats in the form of territorial disputes reduce individual political trust because they indicate a failure by the state to fulfill one of its basic functions to its citizenry.

We begin this chapter by detailing the historical challenges to political trust focusing on patterns of state development and external conflict. We follow with an examination of the overall trends in political trust in noting the variance between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Region. In our analysis section, we use multilevel modeling to test our expectations of these state-level factors by drawing on data from the Afrobarometer and the Arab Barometer survey projects from 1999 to 2011. Finally, we conclude with reflections on the analyses and thoughts on future directions for research on political trust.

## 2. HISTORICAL CHALLENGES TO TRUST IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE ARAB REGION

Regime legitimacy is identified across disciplines as a critical contributing factor to political stability, economic growth, effective policy implementation, overcoming development challenges, and successful democratization and democratic consolidation. Factors that result in individuals ascribing legitimacy to the state lie at the heart of state-society scholarship; comprised of historical, demographic, political, and economic influences. Within the political behavior literature, political trust comprises the most critical indicator of regime legitimacy (Mishler and Rose 2001; Hetherington 2005; Newton 2007). Political trust directly reflects societal confidence in political institutions and the distribution of political authority within the state (Newton 2007). Newton (2007) observes that, conceptually, political trust is so close to the notion of legitimacy that it reflects more than trust in individuals or particular political leaders or even the current administration. In preceding chapters of this volume, political trust in other regions is also discussed in the context of patterns of state-society relations. Zavecz identifies patterns of transition in post-communist states relating the outcomes to trust in specific institutions. Patterns of presidential authority are examined at length in Bargsted et al.'s study of contextual environment and influences on political trust in Latin America.

Regime legitimacy is at the heart of current challenges and events in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region, as instability and civil conflict is rife throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region continues to deal with the aftermath of the domestic and international challenges following the Arab Spring. As regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Region share significant commonalities and points of departure. In each, sovereign state boundaries were determined by colonial powers. Each experienced a lengthy period of time, ranging from decades to centuries, of political and economic control by European powers. Neither established institutions without significant colonial influence. Sub-Saharan African institutions were established under the influence of external actors and further shaped to reflect failures to establish sufficiently large economic productivity to cope with massive demands of development and large debt burdens. Decades of debt, bailouts, and adjustment programs have resulted in the creation of extractive institutions, at least by design, that acquire legitimacy through the redistribution of tax revenues/ individual resource transfers. These institutions are nascent, as the tax base is limited, yet enjoy higher levels of political trust than their much wealthier counterparts in the Arab region.

Two factors influencing institutional development and guiding state-society relations present key differences. The first is the creation of institutions that functioned to distribute state controlled resources, often from resource wealth, along patronage or kinship lines. Decades of affluence and resource rents have resulted in governments that can fiscally function independently of the population and in essence pay for legitimacy. In the Arab region, this evolved in an environment where external threat, from neighbors and as a region at the center of geopolitical interests, was endemic. A consequence was institutional development focused on distribution of revenues and investment in the military. These trends are detailed in specific sections on each region, however support the relationships between factors such as government accountability and responsiveness examined by Van der Meer and corruption examined by Uslaner in preceding chapters of this volume.

### 2.1 *State Origins, State Development, and Institutional Functioning*

A central component of state society relations hinges on the foundations and formation of the state and formal institutional structures; a critical point of departure for understanding political attitudes in each of these regions requires

tracing the evolution of the "sovereign" state. Numerous theoretical works on the process of state-building identify war as a fundamental motivation for the creation of strong and established states (e.g. Tilly 1975; Organski and Kugler 1980; Herbst 1990; Bates 2009). War requires the creation of standing militaries, tax structures, and bureaucracies to administer and manage sovereign control over territories and populations (Tilly 1990; Herbst 2000). Institutional development and bureaucracies are strengthened as the state develops a vested interest in promoting trade and regulating economic exchange in order to increase and streamline revenue streams, decreasing transactions costs and increasing profit flows for individuals (Englebert 2000). This model hold true for the legitimization of government control over political authority and institutions in the West.

Both the African and Arab experience vary in several key components of state origins and subsequent development. Historically, war in Africa is fought between mobile populations spanning state boundaries or engaging in conflict within a state boundary (Bates 2009; Englebert 2000). State-building wars never occurred; many of the territorial boundaries that persist throughout Africa and the Arab world were arbitrarily inscribed by colonial powers without consideration of the ethnic, religious, or linguistic composition of requisite populations yet remain largely intact. In the Arab region, external threats were relevant in shaping state identify, but occurred after state boundaries had been established. Bates (2009) notes that despite the "accidental" national boundaries inscribed by colonial European powers, populations remain politically committed to maintaining the majority of them, perhaps explaining why so many persist more than a half century post-independence. Throughout the Arab region, strong regional kinship networks and patterns or patronage were antecedents to colonial governments, reinforced by "rentier" or distributive structures following independence. Consequently, these patterns contribute to particular ways in which regime legitimacy functions within the region. In this chapter, we argue that post-colonial patterns of state society relations produced either by extractive (tax and redistribution) or distributive (resource rent based without extraction) institutional structures coupled with varied external threat environments explain key levels of variance in individual level political trust across both Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region. These trends are discussed in the subsequent section.

Institutions are comprised of formal structures designed to effectively govern behavior and distribute political authority within a society (North 1981). Capturing the intersection of politics and economics, institutions represent the degree to which the political system is able to formulate and enforce rules. Existing examinations of political performance in the context of electoral competition support this contention; Alemika (2007), using the 3rd round of the Afrobarometer survey, examines the relationship between the quality of elections and political trust noting that in countries with strong post-colonial or apartheid presidents (Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa) and those with regular transfer of power through political competition (Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, and Lesotho) trust in the president, parliament, courts, and police are high. Each of these represents facets of institutional efficiency and performance, despite a focus on single governance attributes, in this case procedural democracy or public approval.

2.1.1 *Sub-Saharan Africa*

The foundations of current Sub Saharan African states precede colonialism; work on legitimacy and state building emphasizes the unique divergent experience of the African continent. Nunn (2008) notes prior to annexation of African territories by European powers, the trans-Atlantic slave trade functioned to decimate social cohesion in the most affluent settled regions along the Western African coast (also see Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). Concentrated settlement, thriving markets, and easy access to oceanic transport facilitated systematic depopulation of the most politically integrated economically advanced regions (Nunn 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). The result was the functional disassembly of nascent institutions and political order. The subsequent "scramble for Africa" was characterized by European efforts to acquire and control resources and territory to increase their own international influence and share of the global economy. Political control of regions was predicated on realization of economic resources resulting in practices of forced labor, forced migration, and population control and exclusion. The cost to human lives, culture, and existing political order was incalculable.[1] Even in the most inclusive colonial models, minority populations were provided with resources and benefits premised on the exclusion of majority populations resulting in social dislocation and the institutionalization of privilege. Politicized identity in many instances became paramount, igniting ethnic divisions that previously had not existed (for an extensive discussion of political utility of identity differences in the African context, see Posner 2004). Colonial control regimes created dual economies, with investment and infrastructure investments concentrated in single commodities (such as mineral ores, gems, rubber) or mono cropping comprising the cash economy and confined to settlements along transit lines with the remainder of the population persisting in subsistence production. This legacy of concentrated economic activity, reliance on single

[1] It is worth noting that the colonial experience across the region was not similar and different patterns of colonial control and influence were established.

commodity exports, and little incentive to broaden participation in the formal economy did little to increase political cohesion between populations characterized by traditionally organized social sub-units characterized by high levels of internal group cohesion (Englebert 2000).

Post-independence, these factors contributed to the creation of neo-patrimonial regimes where elites consolidated and distributed resources to maintain political control and along established kinship or other networks (Englebert 2000). The consequence is a large subset of the population that is excluded from benefits, opportunity, and/or influence over the political system. Herbst (2000) notes that foreign direct investment, at times development assistance, and loans targeted at commodity development have exacerbated this trend. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, despite vast resource wealth, remains one of the poorest global regions with very poor development outcomes. Despite the dire description, many African regimes negotiate these challenges with some measure of success.

Sub-Saharan African countries were subject to further political and economic interference following independence. The immediate post-colonial period was characterized by efforts to attain Cold War objectives characterized by large foreign aid flows and large loan packages. Unlike the Arab region, resource flows were fickle and predicated on political support rather than resource transfers. Several decades later, large debt burdens and failures to attain vibrant diverse economic development resulted in austerity measures adopted as components of structural adjustment programs as a condition of bailouts packages from lenders of last resort. These programs required increased extractive effort based on an expanded tax base, despite a lack of infrastructure, administration, and low levels of development.

A number of countries in the region are structured as "extractive" with at least a token effort aimed at increasing the transfer of individual resources to governments in the form of taxes. As of 2012, debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relieve Initiative by over 33 countries in the region had been attained or was in progress as a consequence of reform in fiscal policy and macroeconomic indicators (Tiwari and Lewis 2012). This reflects a targeted and substantive extractive strategy for financing regional governments.

This environment of austerity is coupled with the reliance on governments as often the sole providers of basic services including minimal health care, adequate access to food and water, education, and other basic needs. The World Bank (2015) reported in 2013 46.8% of the population in the region was living on less than $1.25 a day. Consequently, institutional efficiency and predictability is critical in this context, particularly in influencing individual attitudes.

2.1.2 *The Arab Region*

The evolution of states within the Arab region follows many similarities to Sub-Saharan Africa with some distinct differences. Prior to colonialization of the region, the largely centralized Ottoman Empire dominated the region, inculcating patterns of patrimonialism predicated on family, kinship, or regional loyalties (Anderson 1987). An additional pervasive element of both social and economic organization that persists in the region is the evolution of economic activity based on trade networks and routes rather than on land ownership (Amin 1978). This pattern shaped colonial enterprise during European rule of the region as well. Instead of disrupting existing networks with the consequence of rupturing patterns of social cohesion, colonial patterns of political control reinforced the practice of economic exchange within kinship groups and relative political autonomy.

The realization of massive resource rents, largely in the form of oil, and independence left several structures in place. First, lack of traditions of "landed wealth" coupled with centralized administration left the state in direct receipt of revenues from resource production (Amin 1978). Patterns of inequality created by a large pastoralist population and few landowners evident in other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America did not occur, as wealth and land ownership were not necessarily associated. States were left with few incentives to develop extractive capacity (tax bases) as large resource revenues eclipsed any possible realization of individual resource transfers. In many cases, distributive resources (oil revenues) exceeded both the absorptive and administrative capacity of the state. In cases such as Saudi Arabia, legitimacy became conferred not through extraction and redistribution but through transfer of resource rents and distribution that occur independently of the population. This type of structure forms what Tilly (1990) refers to as the "Sultanate model of the state", with the consequence that patronage and kinship networks become more politically expedient and preferable to alternate models of social organization. This pattern of resource wealth was exacerbated by enormous foreign aid that flowing into what became a strategic region of interest, for example Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan are representative examples (Baraki 1984). Representing a distinct additional form of direct state resource that bypasses the population and is available by elites for distribution along preexisting channels, these practices reinforced the reliance on patronage for social order and organization. This pattern is so pronounced that in some countries such as Lebanon, there has been functionally no stable administrative apparatus since 1975 (Anderson 1987).

In a study examining the political and social environments preceding and following uprisings in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, Rivetti (2015) notes that state society patterns function in a context bearing the imprint of colonial institutions. While actors and the political environment were undergoing complex and abrupt change, much of the organization, patterns, and practices were rooted in long established structures and foundations (Rivetti 2015). One challenge in these transitions is to locate "authentic" or representative political actors outside of identity groups. Limited civil administration evident in many of these countries resulted in governments that failed to provide services despite the revenues to enact such policies to a subpopulation with the consequence that local non state groups filling a service provision vacuum. Salient examples include the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in supporting hospitals and schools in all governorates in Egypt or Hezbollah in Lebanon is widely cited for social service provision ranging from schools to hospitals to agricultural support for Lebanon's Shiite population (UN Office on Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2006). Legitimacy can be transferred from the state in part to these non-state actors. The challenge is to incorporate these actors in a way that incurs responsiveness into a political system that conferred legitimacy upon them through their exclusion. We believe that this, in part, may account for many of the lower levels of political trust in the Arab Region.

We rely on Organski and Kugler's (1980) insights to evaluate the degree institutions are extractive utilizing the concept of relative political extraction, which identifies the expected extraction of individual resources (in this case taxes) of a country accounting for economic endowment and level of development (Kugler and Tammen 2012). Taxes are identified throughout the literature and in particular in the African context as a key component of institutional competency and appropriately reflect levels of ascribed legitimacy to the state (Bates 2009; Pollack 2009; Hutchison and Johnson 2011). However, when patterns of state society relations are premised on institutions distributing rents derived from resources based outside the population as is the case in much of the Arab region, we anticipate that higher levels of extraction on the part of the government will be associated with declines in legitimacy and lower levels of political trust.

## 2.2 *External Threats to the State*

The extensive literature on political behavior and public opinion has long posited a strong relationship between threat (real or perceived) and individual attitudes and behavior. Recent studies examine how salient objective threats to the state, in the form of external militarized conflict, influence individual attitudes and behavior using cross-national survey data (Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Hutchison 2011a, 2011b; Gibler et al. 2012; Miller 2013). Appreciating the nuanced relationship between conflict and political trust is important to understanding a critical facet of regime legitimacy.

Conflict and the threat of conflict is a persistent feature in both the African and Arab regions despite some general characteristics of those international conflicts differing. Threat is an important factor for political trust considering that a fundamental responsibility of any regime is to maintain the integrity of its territory and population. Even small international dispute that does not result in large-scale conflict undermines trust in the government. Hutchison's (2011b) study notes that there is a distinct difference in government approval and trust in the government; even if government approval increases following the onset of a salient external threat (such as one over territorial control), trust in government is likely to decline. In contrast to claims that external threats and militarized disputes produce a rally-'round-the-flag effect, they represent direct evidence to their respective publics that the government is unable to effectively ensure the security of its territory and population, particularly in a context where the overwhelming number of international engagements assume this form.

### 2.2.1 *Sub-Saharan Africa*

Historically, large-scale external military campaigns characterized by strategic objectives have been rare in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions of the world (Lemke 2002). Much more frequent occurrences include the support of small-scale opposition groups by external actors who provide training, arms, sanctuary, and resources to opposition groups or direct small-scale incursions by foreign militias into a single region or territory. Even an exceptional example of an external dispute, the large-scale 1978 Tanzanian invasion of Uganda resulting in Idi Amin's removal, was prompted by a small Ugandan occupation force that attempted annexation of Tanzania's Kagera Salient.[2] This was likely a consequence of deteriorating relations between Amin and Tanzanian President Nyerere, attributable in part to Nyerere's provision of ousted Ugandan President Obote's Uganda's People's Congress opposition force with resources and sanctuary (Acheson-Brown 2001).

[2] This is a region located in the northwest section of Tanzania on the western shore of Lake Victoria.

Generally speaking, although internal conflicts in Africa have been far bloodier, more protracted, and enduring than international conflicts[3], countries in this region continue to experience salient territorial militarized disputes. One of the most contentious issues in the region involves ongoing border struggles between Nigeria and Cameroon over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula.[4] As a result, Nigeria experienced several militarized disputes over territorial issues from the 1990's until the mid 2000's. Uganda is another country in this region periodically involved in territorial disputes; between 2007-2008, Ugandan troops clashed with troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo several times over the border around the Lake Albert Region (Palmer et al. 2015).

2.2.2 *The Arab Region*

The Arab Region is distinctly different. Territorial, religious, ethnic, and geopolitical disputes have fueled a substantial external threat environment. Ongoing rivalries within the region (for example Egypt and Israel, Israel and Lebanon, Iran and Iraq) are enduring (Klein et al. 2006). A case is point is the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, deemed by many to be the highest casualty conventional conflict between developing countries; the Correlates of War Project estimates the total battle deaths to number over 1.25 million (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Until the Arab Spring, conflict within the region superseded challenges to internal stability, resulting in a significantly different approach to state society relations.

The external threat environment has driven the formation of states and reliance on strong leaders. Characterized by frequent border conflicts, salient external threats resulted in institutional development that privileged military influence and efficiency above other administrative apparatus (Gellner and Waterbury 1977). Egypt and Tunisia enjoy large civil administrations emphasizing the professionalization and advancement of military bureaucracy ahead of other administrative entities designated for revenue extraction or social service provision (Anderson 1987). A natural consequence of this development is the military as a relevant political actor coupled with authoritarian rule. The social structures are poorly equipped to deal with political competition and social organization outside of existing distribution networks and structures. This became strikingly evident following the Arab Spring uprisings throughout the region.

Our basic expectations on the primary contextual factors affecting overall political trust levels in the developing world, particularly Africa and the Arab region, we have argued that political trust is predicated on the performance of a government (Hetherington 2005; Newton 2001), particularly in satisfying basic obligations: security and governance. External threats function to decrease political trust in two ways. First, consistent with Hutchison (2011b), a government that is involved in a militarized dispute over territory has demonstrated to the population that it is unable to guarantee security and control over a region that should be under its exclusive control. Even as individuals may approve of actions to defend or retain territory, confidence in the government should decline. We anticipate that territorial disputes, in particular, are likely to have a strong effect on political trust, as they represent more salient threat to both the government and domestic populations (see Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Vasquez 2009; Hutchison 2011a, 2011b; Gibler et al. 2012).

## 3. TRENDS IN TRUST ACROSS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE ARAB REGION

Although both Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region present interesting and important settings to examine political trust, there are only a handful studies that examine political trust in those regions in a systematic fashion in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Kuenzi 2008; Hutchison 2011b; Hutchison and Johnson 2011; Johnson and Hutchison 2012; Linke 2013; Ishiyama and Laoye 2014) and none that directly address political trust in the Arab region. As such, this chapter represents an important opportunity to provide an overview of trends across both regions.

Overall, political trust levels are demonstrably lower in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region.[5] Using our political trust index, Figure 1 plots the average political trust levels across the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa surveyed by the

[3] Notable examples include the Second Congo war between 1998 and 2003 where the Human Security Project Report (2009) notes an estimated 5.4 million died, the Biafran War in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970 where between 1 and 3 million deaths are estimated to have occurred (Madiebo 1980), and the Second Sudanese Civil War between 1983 and 2005, where well over a million people perished (UN 2013).

[4] See Gibler et al. (2012) for more detail about these territorial disputes and how they affected national identity patterns at the sub-national level in Nigeria.

[5] As we detail below (see section 4), the index used here is generated from four different individual indicators of trust in governmental institutions. The Afrobarometer index is created from trust indicators on the president, the courts, the

Afrobarometer project from 1999 to 2009 in Panel A and political trust levels in the Arab region surveyed by the Arab Barometer project from 2006 to 2010 in Panel B.[6] While data limitations prevent us from showing overall political trust levels in the Arab Region from the post-Arab Spring round 3 surveys here, we examine those trends below using available individual trust indicators. Figure 1 shows that the mean level of political trust in both regions hover around the mid-point of a 4-point scale (0-3) with Sub-Saharan Africa region slightly above and the Arab region at the mid-point. Citizens in both regions are relatively lukewarm in their political trust of institutions. Figure 1 also reveals how stable overall political trust has remained across both regions over time, particularly when considering the volatility associated with many of the governments (albeit more so in Sub-Saharan Africa). We observe that overall political trust peaked around 2005-2006 in Sub-Saharan Africa and in 2009-2011 in the Arab region.

***FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE***

## 3.1 *Sub-Saharan Africa*

Few cross-national studies examine patterns of political trust in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly over time; the majority of existing published work focuses on either single-country studies or examines a cross-section of countries during a single survey year. Seminal and major works on public opinion and attitudes in Sub-Saharan Africa primarily focus on democratic and economic reform offering few insights on political trust in general (e.g. Bratton et al. 2005). Extant studies offer support for the proposition that regime legitimacy is a key contributing factor, but again are limited in either the attribute of legitimacy they examine, in temporal scope, or in country coverage. Hutchison (2011b) finds that external threat and militarized international disputes are associated with lower levels of political trust in African countries using the first two rounds of Afrobarometer surveys, while in a study of post-election violence in Kenya, Linke (2013) identifies local context and individual exposure to violence as critical factors associated with lower political trust. Further, Hutchison and Johnson (2011) demonstrate a strong association between institutional effectiveness and political trust in African countries using the first three rounds of Afrobarometer surveys.

***FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE***

Here we observe the cross-national differences between Sub-Saharan African countries across the first four rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys in two distinct ways. Figure 2 displays the mean aggregate political trust level for each country surveyed in the Afrobarometer project. The chart shows mean trust levels and the minimum and maximum values of mean political trust observed in the country if surveyed multiple times. This figure provides a sense of which countries have higher average levels of political trust and observed country-level variance over time. Figure 3 presents a panel of graphs charting political trust by country over time.[7]

***FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE***

Unlike the relative stability in regional trust levels that we observe in Figure 1, figures here reveal considerable range in political trust levels across and within countries in the region. The within-country variability strongly suggests that state-level factors play a large role influencing overall political trust as massive changes in demographic composition over a relatively short-period time is unlikely. In terms of our key variables, levels of extractive capacity and external threat environment, the overall trends here are suggestive but not conclusive. Given our expectations, it is not surprising that Senegal and Tanzania rate high in political trust. Tanzania enjoys a history of political inclusion based on the populist precedents set during the post-independence period by Nyere (with the exception of Zanzibar). Recently, the country witnessed parallel development of a professional civil service and intrusion of distributional patronage networks into the bureaucracy resulting in both accolades and concern in the evaluation of Tanzania's governance and institutional structure. Institutional performance in Tanzania is consistently high with a stable percentage of tax revenue contributing to total revenue. From 1990 to 2013, the contribution of taxes to total revenue ranged between 83 and 92 percent (World Bank 2014). Senegal demonstrates even higher levels of tax contributions to total revenues, in the same period,

police, and the national electoral commissions and the Arab Barometer index is based on indicators on the courts, parliament, the police, and political parties.

[6] The Afrobarometer is a survey project conducted across 20 Sub-Saharan African countries measuring political, social, and economic attitudes (Bratton et al. 2005). These data are publically available and accessed at www.afrobarometer.org. The Arab Barometer is a survey project conducted across 12 countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa measuring political, social, and economic attitudes. These data are publically available and accessed at www.arabbarometer.org.

[7] Burkina Faso and Liberia are not included in this figure since they were only surveyed at one point in time.

the range is between 93 and 98 percent (World Bank 2014). Senegal also is characterized by a transition to competitive elections with alternating political parties assuming control over the last two decades following a long history of one party rule. In each instance, political control and patronage networks failed to disrupt individual resource transfers in the form of taxes indicating strong and consistently functioning institutions. Neither country experienced territorial militarized disputes during this time. This absence of a salient external threat reflects a more positive performance in the area of external security.

Of significant note is the lower level of political trust in Nigeria compared to the overall sample, illustrated perhaps most compellingly in Figure 3. This anomaly illustrates the contrast between extractive and distributive institutional structures described in our theoretical model. Nigeria is a country of contradictions and at the confluence of this argument. With the largest population in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria offers an excellent case study for examination of our argument within a single country. Several sources of conflict in state-society relations are present: in the northwestern and central states, religious conflicts between Muslim and Christian populations have resulted in the adoption of parallel Sharia courts along secular court structures. Ongoing settler-indigne conflicts abound between groups identified as indigenous and those settling later (primarily in central Nigerian states). The government has exacerbated these conflicts by dividing resources and political offices between groups resulting in competition for influence. Finally, resource conflicts exist in the Niger Delta region between ethnic groups for control of resource rents, again exacerbated by the strategy of creating new states along ethnic lines. These trends are largely unexamined at the sub-national level; Johnson and Hutchison (2012) demonstrate that institutional efficiency increases trust in courts and police even among Christians in the north western (extractive) Sharia states.

An oil exporter since pre-independence, Nigeria's oil rents range in the survey periods between 27% and 15% of its overall GDP (World Bank 2014). Reliance and distribution of resource rents reinforces ethnic divisions in oil producing regions and produced kinship and patronage based networks extensively discussed below (Ikelegbe 2005). Conflict over the distribution of oil rents were a substantial contribution to the 1967 Biafra civil war. Oil producing states currently retain 13% of taxes and revenue from resource rents prior to distribution to the federal government and redistribution (up from the historical rate 10% between 1968 -1989). This effort to embrace fiscal federalism was designed to mitigate ethnic competition and revenue capture, however the distributive attributes of the oil dominated economy in the Niger Delta region produced competition and opposition to formal institutional structures, exacerbating conflict. Nigeria also experienced a series of territorial disputes with Cameroon over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula preceding and through the survey period. This is a more complex issue than our simple summary offers, yet it highlights the models of extraction and distribution we identify as shaping state-society relations.

## 3.2 *The Arab Region*

Studies on the Arab region are often focused solely on democratic attitudes with little focus on political trust (e.g. Tessler 2002; Jamal 2006, 2007, 2009; Jamal and Tessler 2008). Although we examine the overall trend in political trust across the Arab region up to 2011 in Figure 1, the post-Arab Spring round 3 survey allows us initial examination of whether this regional upheaval had any noticeable effect on patterns of trust across countries. The round 3 survey has significant data limitations restricting our ability to analyze overall trends as well as preventing incorporation into the analyses below. Most notably, round 3 only offers two trust indicators, trust in parliament and trust in police, asked in the previous rounds of the Arab Barometer. Further limiting our ability to examine overall trends is that in two important Arab Spring countries, Tunisia and Egypt, only trust in police is measured across multiple surveys. Thus, while this study is the first empirical assessment of political trust and institutional performance for the region, we are cautious to draw any strong inferences given the smaller number of cases and data limitations.

Figure 4 plots out trust in parliament and trust in police across ten Arab region countries over time revealing that the regional changes in these trust indicators following 2010 were relatively stochastic. Although trust in police increased in seven out of the ten countries, only half of the countries experienced an increase in trust for parliament. Further examination also reveals that the effect of the Arab Spring varied considerably both across the region and within individual countries.

***FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE***

In Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, countries where governments were overthrown during the Arab Spring, we see that trust in police increased following this upheaval in Tunisia and Yemen but decreased sharply in Egypt. In the case of Egypt, the decline in trust in police is understandable given that both surveys were conducted during the tumultuous period between President Hosni Murbarak's resignation and the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi that was marked by continued violent

protest.[8] In Yemen, both trust in police and trust in parliament increased over time following the unrest that eventually resulted in the removal of President Ali Abdullah Saleh from power.

In countries which experienced extensive major protests during the Arab Spring (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan), changes in trust for parliament and police were inconsistent both across countries and, in most instances, within countries. Only Algeria and the Sudan experienced similar changes across both measures as trust in the parliament and police increased in Algeria but both declined in Sudan. In the other three countries, there were divergent trends in trust as both Iraq and Jordan experienced increased trust in police but declining trust in parliament while these trends were reversed in Morocco. Overall, the post-Arab Spring trends in political trust offer no clear discernible patterns and confirm that we still have much to learn about how the Arab Spring influenced trust across the region in future research.

Figure 5 compares regional mean levels of political trust across institutions. Political trust is higher across Sub-Saharan African institutions than in the Arab Region, despite lower levels of economic development and higher levels of internal instability. We posit that this is in part due to inherent differences between the extractive vs. distributive institutional models and their corresponding social structures and arrangements.

***FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE***

Overall trends in the region are consistent with our arguments on institutional capacity and political trust, we posit that higher levels of extraction in Sub-Saharan Africa, where revenues are reliant largely on taxes, should be positively related to political trust. When legitimacy hinges on redistribution of tax revenues rather than simple distribution of independent rents, governments are more reliant and responsive to populations, as they require them to function. In distributive institutional structures, populations expect that resource rents will provide the government with the necessary resources to function and implement policy. As noted by Rivetti and Cavatorta in the preceding chapter, a key facet of political trust is the predictability of government actions. Individuals in distributive institutional systems have a significant expectation surrounding the role of government and social structures in resource distribution. Changes in these structures, including "state building" efforts to increase the tax base and pull the population in, are likely to significantly disrupt these established relationships and current patterns of state society relations. Consequently, in *distributive* institutional designs, higher levels of extraction are likely to be associated with lower levels of political trust. In the section that follows, we conduct a more rigorous test of these expectations using multilevel modeling estimation techniques on survey data from both regions.

## 4. Data and Analysis

As noted above, we use cross-national survey data from two sources, the Afrobarometer and the Arab Barometer, to assess political trust in both Africa and the Arab regions. Our data analysis examines these data as opposed to the more widely used World Values Survey (WVS) for several reasons. First, the political trust questions are more direct indicators of political trust, asking respondents whether they "trust" certain political institutions rather than report their "confidence" in those institutions as measured in the WVS.[9] Second, the questions in both barometers are more consistent across countries and time and wide-ranging in terms of individual-level predictors than the WVS, particularly for the countries in these regions. A more comprehensive individual-level model allows us to draw stronger inferences regarding the influence of the macro-level characteristics on political trust by reducing the likelihood that the reported relationships are due to compositional effects. Finally, and most importantly, the barometers allow us to draw from larger samples of countries and points in time than the offerings in the WVS.[10] In these analyses, we draw from rounds 1-4 of the Afrobarometer, which were conducted across 20 countries between 1999 and 2009, and rounds 1 and 2 of the Arab Barometer, which were conducted across 12 countries between 2006 and 2011. From the Afrobarometer, we can

[8] The round 2 survey in July 2011 was conducted five months after President Mubarak resigned the presidency while the round 3 survey in March 2013 was conducted three months prior to the overthrow of President Morsi.

[9] Norris points out in the earlier chapter conceptualizing political trust, both indicators of trust and institutional confidence do tap into a similar dynamic.

[10] Our samples in both Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region are not representative of the regions and present challenges when attempting to generalize findings. As Bratton et al. (2005) note, countries selected for the Afrobarometer tend to be more populous, democratic, and less prone to civil conflict than found in truly representative sample. Similarly, the countries selected in the Arab Barometer, particularly in the earlier rounds prior to Arab Spring, are more politically stable, less prone to internal strife, and economically advanced. We anticipate that our results will favor higher levels of political trust than what we would observe in a truly representative sample in these regions.

examine 65 macro-level units (surveys representing country and year) and 78,000 individual respondents while the Arab Barometer offers 16 macro-level units and 19,000 respondents.

We construct our political trust measure from the Afrobarometer surveys by taking the individual mean from four different indicators of individuals' trust across several government institutions: the president, the courts, the police, and the national electoral commission.[11] While this general measure of political trust differs slightly from Hutchison and Johnson (2011), these four items were included across all four rounds of the Afrobarometer, allowing us the broadest coverage across countries and time.[12] We use a similar construction for our political trust measure in the Arab Barometer surveys by drawing from four different indicators: the courts, parliament, the police, and political parties.[13] By assessing trust across different dimensions, our measure represents generalized trust in government rather than an indicator of support for any particular leader or government agency. For each item, individual respondents were asked to report their trust level for that particular sector of government along a four-point scale (0-3). By using the individual mean across their respective four indicators, our dependent variable ranges from 0 (low trust) to 3 (high trust) for both the Afrobarometer and the Arab Barometer analyses.[14]

A true test of our theoretical expectations requires estimation that accounts for both the macro-level and individual-level factors affecting individual trust. To accomplish this and isolate the effects of our key independent variables, we construct a multilevel dataset that allows us to control for factors that are associated with political trust at both the individual and state levels.

## 4.1 *Individual-level and Macro-level Variables*

For comparability reasons, we tried to construct similar individual-level models across both the Afrobarometer and the Arab Barometer but there are differences in individual-level predictors of political trust between the two regional survey projects. While not ideal, we contend that these differences in individual-level models should not overly bias our results, particularly since we are most concerned with the relationships between the macro-level factors and political trust. In both surveys we use standard measures of socioeconomic indicators but rely on slightly different attitudinal and behavioral predictors.[15]

For the Afrobarometer models, we base our individual-level model of political trust on Hutchison and Johnson (2011) and Hutchison (2011b). In addition to socioeconomic indicators, *age, gender*, *education,* and *urban/rural residency,* the Afrobarometer models include measures for *government performance, democratic satisfaction, government satisfaction, economic satisfaction, political participation, political interest,* that we expect to have positive influence as well as indicators for *economic hardship* and *media exposure* which we expect negatively affect political trust. For the Arab Barometer models, we tried to emulate the Afrobarometer models but differences in individual-level indicators prevents from a complete match. The Arab Barometer models include measures for *government performance, government satisfaction, government responsiveness, economic satisfaction, unconditional government support, social trust, political participation,* and *political interest* in addition to socioeconomic indicators. All told, these individual variables try to account for an individual's orientation and satisfaction toward government, level of political interest and engagement, economic satisfication, and socioeconomic characteristics.

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[11] The Cronbach's alpha score for the simple additive index is 0.79. Factor analysis demonstrates the variables loaded on the factor above 0.64 with an average loading of 0.68. A factor score generated from this loading correlated with our measure at 99%.

[12] Hutchison and Johnson (2011) relied on a six indicator measure of political trust that included these four measures as well as trust in the armed forces and the government-led media drawn from the first three rounds of the Afrobarometer. The armed forces and government-led media indicators were not included in round 4 of the Afrobarometer.

[13] The Cronbach's alpha score for the simple additive index is 0.77. Factor analysis revealed that all of the variables loaded on the factor above 0.55 with an average loading of 0.67. A factor score generated from this loading correlated with our measure at 99%.

[14] One significant concern in this analysis is uncertainly over the reliability of trust measures across authoritarian regimes. Rivetti and Cavatorta note in their chapter that concern respondents indicate more 'trust' in government due to fears of state reprisals is often misplaced.

[15] We do not include a measure of corruption perception at the individual-level despite the fact that, as Uslaner observes elsewhere in this volume, this is important in both of these regions because we do not have full coverage of this item across our samples.

For the macro-level variables, we include measures for *militarized interstate disputes, relative political extraction, economic development*, *democratic longevity* (Afrobarometer)*, democracy-autocracy scores* (Arab Barometer), *civil conflict,* and *ethnic fractionalization.*[16] In the interest of space, we summarize the variable descriptions as well as the data sources and coding procedures for the individual-level and macro-level variables in our appendix.

## 4.2 *Method*

We are most interested in examining how macro-level factors such as political capacity and external threats affect individual political trust; our estimation strategy and technique must effectively address the nested nature of our data. Ignoring the multilevel nature of our data would result in significant statistical and inferential errors, including underestimation of the standard errors for our macro-level variables or ecological fallacy problems (see Hutchison and Johnson 2011 for a more detailed discussion). We rely on multilevel statistical modeling techniques that can account for both the spatial (countries) and temporal (time) differentiation. This technique allows us to generate unbiased standard errors by jointly modelling the macro-level and individual-level data to estimate separate variance structures (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).[17]

## 4.3 *Multi-Level Analyses*

Table 1 presents four multilevel political trust models using the Afrobarometer sample and data. Model 1 offers the individual-level model as a baseline for evaluation of the macro-level factors affecting political trust. Model 2 incorporates the state-level control variables to the baseline individual-level model. Models 3 and 4 introduce our key independent variables to assess their independent effects and evaluate the influence of state external threat environment and political capacity on individual trust levels.

***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE***

Model 1 begins by evaluating the individual-level predictors of political trust. This specification serves as a baseline model for comparison with the later models that include the state-level variables and a point of comparison with other regional studies that primarily examine political trust through individual-level predictors. Although we are principally interested in the macro-level effects, individual-level predictors remain the strongest influence on individual trust. Similar to the previous work on political trust in Africa, the individual-level predictors perform as theoretically expected and with little to no difference in their effects from individuals in other regions of the world. This is an important point worth highlighting as one of the common myths found in the conventional wisdom regarding African individual political behavior is that it is qualitatively different than other regions, particularly North America and Europe. We find little evidence to suggest that individual-level antecedents of political trust amongst Africans are much different than the rest of the world (see Bratton et al 2005; Hutchison and Johnson 2011; Hutchison 2011b).

While we incorporate our state-level control variables for comparison purposes in Model 2, we are primarily interested in Models 3 and 4 where our key independent variables are introduced.[18] Model 3 re-examines the relationship studied in Hutchison and Johnson (2011) regarding the effect of relative political extraction on individual political trust but with a larger sample and a slightly different set of controls. Our model reveals a positive and statistically significant relationship between capacity and trust, consistent with our expectations for Africa. Higher relative political extraction is associated with greater levels of individual trust across African countries; increasing governmental efficiency is one critical step towards stimulating greater political trust throughout society.

Our militarized interstate dispute variables are introduced to our baseline model in Model 4. We find more evidence supporting previous research which places state-level external threat as a key explanatory factor in accounting for

[16] For the most part, the macro-level variables measure both cross-country and within-country temporal variation with the exception of ethnic fractionalization which captures country-level variation only. However, given the smaller number of temporal units compared to cross-national units, we run a higher risk of conflating cross-national and longitudinal variance. Thus, our models below are most likely reflective of cross-national variance rather than changes across time.

[17] We use Stata 13 to estimate the random coefficient multilevel models below. In all of the analyses below, we employ a random coefficient model specification allowing for random slopes for our government satisfaction and government performance measures.

[18] In terms of our control variables, the most surprising finding is that civil conflict does not have a statistically significant effect across models. Theoretically, we strongly expected a negative relationship between civil conflict and political trust.

differences in trust across countries in Africa. Model 4 reveals that while external threat does affect trust, it is only threat relating to territory that is salient enough to influence individual attitudes. This finding is consistent with previous findings linking territorial disputes to individual political attitudes and behavior (see Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Hutchison 2011a, 2011b; Gibler et al. 2012; Miller 2013). The results in Model 4 support Hutchison's (2011b) work linking territorial disputes to lower individual trust levels in Africa but over a larger sample and improved dispute data. The results support our contention that salient threats to the state's territorial integrity can represent policy failure to the respective domestic population serving to reduce overall political trust. The parameter estimates also reveal that territorial disputes have stronger substantive effects on political trust than most of the individual-level predictors.

Model 4 represents our fully specified model including both the relative political extraction and external threat measures. The results here are consistent with previous findings on African political trust in that we observe a significant positive relationship between state capacity and trust as well as a significant negative relationship between territorial disputes and trust. The parameter estimates suggests that the effects of extraction and territorial disputes are largely independent of one another.[19]

The Afrobarometer models offer strong support for our generalized expectations, demonstrating that governments focusing on improving political extraction will foster a higher degree of political trust while states with low political extraction will continue to suffer from legitimacy problems from their respective domestic societies. These findings also reinforce the contention that the rally effects that often follow salient external threats to the state do not affect trust evaluations in a positive manner, despite the strong relationship between government approval and political trust. Rather, territorial disputes appear to erode individuals' trust or confidence in their government.

Table 2 presents results on the Arab region using the survey data from the Arab Barometer. These models are significant in that, to our knowledge, they represent the first multilevel analysis of political trust within the region. Model 5 presents our individual-level model of political trust. We find almost no deviations from the general expectations regarding the direction and statistical significance of our individual-level predictors. Like Sub-Saharan Africa, these results fly in the face of the conventional wisdom that individual political behavior in the Arab Region is qualitatively different than other regions. At the individual level, the attitudes and characteristics expected to positively or negatively affect political trust coincide with the majority of previous literature based in European or North American contexts. We observe that individuals are more likely to trust their respective government if they believe the government has performed well in achieving important domestic objectives, are largely satisfied with their government, believe that government is responsive to ordinary citizen needs, are satisfied with their country's economic performance, support their government, are interest in politics, are trusting of others, and female. Conversely, older, more educated, and employed individuals are less likely to trust their government.

***TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE***

Model 6 introduces our state-level control variables demonstrates some significant differences in how they affect individual political trust compared to other regions. The positive coefficient for economic development is in-line with expectations and we note that ethnic fractionalization and civil conflict are also positively associated with political trust. The effect of civil conflict on individual trust is particularly surprising and may warrant future analysis. The negative effect of the country's level democracy on political trust is not especially surprising when considering that this region is still largely dominated by autocracies with tight controls on media freedom. Individuals in the few relatively open societies have greater exposure reports of government ineffectiveness and corruption which serves to lower trust (see Uslaner's earlier chapter).

Models 7 and 8 introduce our political extraction and external threat variables. Relative political capacity is negatively associated with individual political trust in the Arab region. Although this finding is the opposite of what we find in Sub-Saharan Africa, it aligns with our expectations of the role that political extraction plays in this region. The

[19] Although space considerations do not allow us to address this, we do expect that our main independent variables to affect different items of our index differently. In Hutchison (2011b), territorial disputes negatively affect trust in the army but have no significant impact on trust in the courts in Sub-Saharan Africa. We expect a similar differential effect here as well with reduced trust toward political institutions most commonly linked to state security apparatus, such as the police and president/prime minister, under conditions of salient external threat. We expect trust political institutions linked to tax effort and enforcement, such as parliament, president/prime minister, and the courts, to vary more strongly with levels of relative political extraction.

relationship between extractive institutions and individual trust is contingent on several factors, including individuals conferring legitimacy based on the reliance of governments on populations. In the Arab region, higher levels of extractive institutional capacity results in lower levels of political trust because the extractive institutions are largely linked to distributive institutional structures. Our findings here correspond with previous studies on distributive states, where resource increases are not accompanied by corresponding increases in available resources or the provision of public goods.

Although we are unable to directly test the proposition across our two survey samples due to the differences in individual-level variables, these findings are consistent with our logical argument. In distributive states, increasing individual transfer of resources without corresponding changes in responsiveness or social organization (such as disrupting entrenched kinship or patronage networks) are likely to only diminish levels of political trust. A contrasting case in point is Mexico, where significant disruption of patron client relationships established by the PRI were accompanied by significant electoral reform. Consequently, as illustrated by Bargsted et al. in this volume, Mexico's range of individual level political trust is average among its regional peers and significantly higher than nearly all countries within the Arab Region.

Figure 6 plots the effect of extractive institutions on individual trust across the regions using the same scale for comparability purposes.[20] Although the difference in the direction of the relationship between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Region is stark, the strength of the overall effect of political extraction on political trust is similar. What is clear from this figure is that extractive capacity plays a large role in shaping political trust throughout society but the direction of that effect is contingent on organization of the society as either extractive or distributive.

***FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE***

We find strong support for our expectations regarding the ability of salient external threat to influence individual political trust. As in Sub-Saharan Africa, we observe that territorial threats to the state negatively affect individual trust and non-territorial disputes have no significant effect. Substantively, the effect of a single territorial dispute in decreasing political trust in Arab Region is about twice as strong as found in Sub-Saharan Africa. In calculating the marginal effects moving from zero to a single territorial MID across both regions, we find that it decreases trust in the Arab Region by about 15% (-.18) compared to only 7% (-.12) in Sub-Saharan Africa.[21]

The results from the Arab region are important in that they mirror the dynamic observed in Africa (also see Hutchison 2011b). Taken together, these findings lend further support for the contention that the "rally effect" observed in more advanced countries following salient threat differs significantly throughout large segments of the developing world suggesting that in regions rife with violent political conflict, the most important responsibility of a government is to provide security and to mitigate territorially motivated threats.

## 5. DISCUSSION

Our results strongly support the contention that two facets of regime legitimacy, the ability of a government to control a designated population and territory and the reliance of governments on populations for critical resources, are critical in promoting political trust in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the Arab region, we find strong support for the argument that security challenges significantly inhibit political trust. Our findings support previous work on influences of political attitudes in Sub-Saharan Africa and make several important contributions to the literature. Individual-level predictors of political trust attitudes amongst Sub-Saharan Africans are virtually identical to those found in other regions of the world, challenging conventional wisdom that African political attitudes and behaviors are qualitatively different than in other parts of the world. We also demonstrate that state-level contextual factors are highly salient in influencing political trust and regime legitimacy and the effect of certain state-level factors, such as state capacity, on individual political trust can vary by region.

[20] The Sub-Saharan Africa sample has a wider range between the minimum and maximum levels of capacity than the Arab Region. Figure 6 does not show the full substantive effect of capacity on trust as it moves from minimum to maximum values for Sub-Saharan Africa.

[21] Sub-Saharan African countries experienced a higher number of territorial disputes than those in the Arab Region, we also calculated the marginal effects of territorial disputes in Sub-Saharan Africa moving from minimum (0) to maximum (4); moving from the minimum to maximum number of territorial disputes decreases political trust by about 38% (-.46).

The role of state-level contextual factors should not be overlooked by either academics or policy makers when investigating how to increase legitimacy. In the context of institutional performance, governments should carefully consider the consequences of policy outcomes that decrease the need for the establishment of a tax base and extractive capacity of the state. The current "Billion Dollar Map" proposed by the World Bank to identify Africa's undiscovered oil and mineral resources has tremendous consequences for regime legitimacy. Large resource rents discourage governments from pursuing or maintaining their tax effort, as individual taxes are dwarfed by resource rents and remain much more difficult and politically costly to collect. If legitimacy hinges on extractive rather than distributive institutions, this approach should be pursued with caution. Territorially-based militarized disputes also highlight the importance of basic functions of government, the provision of security and control over coercive capacity of designated territory, in promoting legitimacy. In a region where population movements are common, conflicts often span borders, and "contagion" occurs with some frequency, disputes are more relevant than simply the body count associated with a particular clash.

## 6. FUTURE RESEARCH

Our study has important implications for how cross-national analyses of political trust can and should be studied in subsequent research. Research examining political attitudes across countries or even across time should be cognizant that individuals are influenced by contextual factors that differ immensely across countries. To account for these critical influences on individual political behavior, researchers must deal with the multilevel nature of their data. Failure to evaluate the security environment and external threats will result in missing a major level influence on individual political trust. Consideration of unique regional macro-level factors will result in a more nuanced and clear understanding of the foundations of political trust. Finally, although Sub-Saharan Africa faces stiff challenges when it comes to regime legitimacy, our findings offer some hope that countries that improve their institutional capacity and avoid external threats will be rewarded with greater trust from their respective societies.

Some immediate future implications are evident for each region as well. One of the major challenges for Sub-Saharan Africa is meeting its vast human and economic development needs. Despite numerous efforts and strategies for increasing development in the region, one of the most recent international initiatives taking the form of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's), which relies on resource transfer from wealthy countries to the region. Foreign aid is fickle, and few of the current MDG's will be attained. Any long term economic development strategy will require a lengthy road; most rely on the creation or reinforcement of export based economic models. The implications of high value commodity exports as a major development strategy are discussed above. Despite criticism, few alternate economic development models exist. Unlike the Arab region, patronage and kinship networks are fragmented, with any resulting distributional structures along these lines likely to exclude major portions of the population and result in significantly lower levels of political trust.

In the Arab Region, shifting away from distributional institutions to extractive ones are likely to also result in even lower levels of political trust. One of the significant challenges of countries in the region is managing potentially uncertain resource revenues, and changes in supply and global demand. Regime legitimacy that hinges on maintaining significant resource transfers is perilous. The Arab region offers valuable contributions in examining the influence of threat environment on political trust as the repercussions of the Arab Spring continue to generate external security threats from neighboring countries. We expect that the region will face increasing external militarized conflict in the future. Furthermore, trends in political trust following the Arab Spring lends little clarity as whether these events had a generalized effect across the region. In fact, these trends suggest that the effect of the Arab Spring was highly conditional within each affected country and most certainly warrants further in-depth investigation in future research.

Given the paucity of previous research in both regions, they each offer a multitude of different directions for further research on political trust. The state-level conditions facing countries in these regions differ significantly from other parts of the world offering opportunities to improve our understanding of political trust. Many of the factors addressed in other chapters of this volume seem to have relevance in both of these regions, including corruption, macro- and micro-level economic performance, and the divergence between expected and actual government performance. We expect that culturalist explanations of political trust will find both regions rich with cases for comparative analysis. Similarly, both regions are strong candidates for a more comprehensive analysis on the effects of income inequality in shaping individual political trust. Lastly, researchers should look beyond cross-national approaches and explore the rich sub-national variation found in these countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. We have only scratched the surface on political trust in both Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab region in this chapter. It is up to future researchers to build on these foundations for a more systematic understanding of political trust in these regions.

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**FIGURE 1.** Political Trust in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Region over Time






**FIGURE 2.** Average Political Trust Levels across Sub-Saharan Africa



**FIGURE 3.** Political Trust in Sub-Saharan Africa by Country over Time




Source: Afrobarometer

**FIGURE 4.** Average Political Trust Levels across the Arab Region



**FIGURE 5.** Difference in Trust between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Region



**TABLE 1.** Political Trust in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1999-2009

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | Model 3 | | Model 4 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Individual-Level:** | | | | | | | | |
| Government Performance | .13** | (.008) | .13** | (.008) | .13** | (.008) | .13** | (.008) |
| Democratic Satisfaction | .14** | (.006) | .14** | (.006) | .14** | (.006) | .14** | (.006) |
| Government Satisfaction | .32** | (.011) | .32** | (.011) | .32** | (.011) | .32** | (.011) |
| Economic Satisfaction | .03** | (.004) | .03** | (.004) | .03** | (.004) | .03** | (.004) |
| Political Participation | .03** | (.008) | .03** | (.008) | .03** | (.008) | .03** | (.008) |
| Political Interest | .02 | (.009) | .02 | (.009) | .02 | (.009) | .02 | (.009) |
| Economic Hardship | -.02* | (.007) | -.02* | (.007) | -.02* | (.007) | -.02* | (.007) |
| Media Exposure | -.04** | (.004) | -.04** | (.004) | -.04** | (.004) | -.04** | (.004) |
| Age | .00** | (.000) | .00** | (.000) | .00** | (.000) | .00** | (.000) |
| Gender (1=female) | .00 | (.000) | .00 | (.000) | .00 | (.000) | .00 | (.000) |
| Education | -.05** | (.006) | -.05** | (.006) | -.05** | (.006) | -.05** | (.006) |
| Urban | -.07** | (.009) | -.07** | (.009) | -.07** | (.009) | -.07** | (.009) |
| **Country-Level:** | | | | | | | | |
| Relativel Political Extraction | | | | | .16* | (.076) | .13* | (.061) |
| Territorial MIDs (5 year) | | | | | | | -.12* | (.058) |
| Non-Territorial MIDs (5 year) | | | | | | | -.03 | (.024) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | | | -.04 | (.133) | .16 | (.127) | .16 | (.131) |
| Economic Development | | | -.49 | (.328) | -.73* | (.345) | -.51 | (.356) |
| Civil Conflict | | | -.11 | (.124) | -.08 | (.126) | -.04 | (.130) |
| Continuous Democracy | | | .004 | (.004) | .007 | (.004) | .004 | (.004) |
| **Constant** | .86** | (.047) | 1.09** | (.156) | .80** | (.165) | .84** | (.163) |
| ***Random Effects Parameter*** | | | | | | | | |
| Survey | .084 | (.015) | .084 | (.015) | .078 | (.014) | .074 | (.012) |
| Residual | .418 | (.015) | .418 | (.015) | .418 | (.015) | .418 | (.015) |
| ***Intra-class Correlation***† | .17 | | .16 | | .16 | | .15 | |
| ***Observations*** | | | | | | | | |
| Surveys | 64 | | 64 | | 64 | | 64 | |
| Individuals | 78410 | | 78410 | | 78410 | | 78410 | |

* = Coefficient is significant the 0.05 level. ** = Coefficient is significant the 0.01 level.

† The intra-class correlation for the oneway ANOVA is .18.

**Note:** Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients estimated using Stata 13, with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Afrobarometer

**TABLE 2.** Political Trust in the Arab Region, 2006-2011

| | Model 5 | | Model 6 | | Model 7 | | Model 8 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Individual-Level:** | | | | | | | | |
| Government Performance | .28** | (.025) | .28** | (.025) | .28** | (.025) | .28** | (.025) |
| Government Satisfaction | .05** | (.005) | .05** | (.005) | .05** | (.005) | .05** | (.005) |
| Government Responsiveness | .14** | (.018) | .14** | (.018) | .14** | (.018) | .14** | (.018) |
| Economic Satisfaction | .11** | (.020) | .11** | (.020) | .11** | (.020) | .11** | (.020) |
| Unconditional Government Support | .04** | (.013) | .04** | (.013) | .04** | (.013) | .04** | (.013) |
| Political Interest | .03* | (.015) | .03* | (.015) | .03* | (.015) | .03* | (.015) |
| Social Trust | .15** | (.019) | .15** | (.019) | .15** | (.019) | .15** | (.019) |
| Age | -.01* | (.004) | -.01* | (.004) | -.01* | (.004) | -.01* | (.004) |
| Gender (1=female) | .06** | (.020) | .06** | (.020) | .06** | (.020) | .06** | (.020) |
| Education | -.02* | (.009) | -.02* | (.009) | -.02* | (.009) | -.02* | (.009) |
| Employed | -.03* | (.014) | -.03* | (.014) | -.03* | (.014) | -.03* | (.014) |
| **Country-Level:** | | | | | | | | |
| Relativel Political Extraction | | | | | -.23* | (.090) | -.15* | (.064) |
| Territorial MIDs (5 year) | | | | | | | -.18** | (.043) |
| Non-Territorial MIDs (5 year) | | | | | | | .01 | (.018) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | | | .66** | (.110) | .61** | (.089) | .64** | (.110) |
| Economic Development | | | .96** | (.282) | 1.39** | (.292) | 1.22** | (.193) |
| Civil Conflict | | | .15* | (.065) | .14* | (.053) | .10* | (.041) |
| Democracy-Autocracy Score | | | -.04** | (.007) | -.04** | (.003) | -.04** | (.004) |
| **Constant** | .48** | (.112) | -.49* | (.220) | -.55** | (.168) | -.49** | (.123) |
| ***Random Effects Parameters*** | | | | | | | | |
| Survey | .078 | (.020) | .057 | (.019) | .043 | (.015) | .038 | (.016) |
| Residual | .382 | (.023) | .382 | (.023) | .382 | (.023) | .382 | (.023) |
| ***Intra-class Correlation***† | .13 | | .13 | | .10 | | .09 | |
| ***Observations*** | | | | | | | | |
| Surveys | 14 | | 14 | | 14 | | 14 | |
| Individuals | 13458 | | 13458 | | 13458 | | 13458 | |

* = Coefficient is significant the 0.05 level. ** = Coefficient is significant the 0.01 level.

† The intra-class correlation for the oneway ANOVA is .22.

**Note:** Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients estimated using Stata 13, with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Arab Barometer

**FIGURE 6.** Varied Effect of Political Capacity on Political Trust across Regions